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In the 1990s in most OECD countries “perceived employment insecurity has become more 
widespread” (OECD, 1997). However, after the economic recovery in the second half of the 1990s, 
this feeling of insecurity decreased, although with important differences between countries (Auer 
and Cazes, 2003).  
Employment stability is desirable for both workers, who rank it among the most important factors 
for job satisfaction (European Commission, 2001), and for firms, who dislike high turnover and 
prefer stable employment relationship in order to retain human capital investment and reduce both 
workforce screening and selection costs.  
On the other hand, the intensification of competitive pressures, especially after the process of 
globalisation and the rapid expansion of new technologies, has called for more flexibility in the 
labour markets for both firms and workers.  
Two different relationships between work security and flexibility have been conjectured, the first 
supporting the “trade off” theory and the second the “flexicurity” thesis (Muffels and Luijkx, 2005). 
According to the first hypothesis, a negative relationship between flexibility and security exists: 
flexible employment patterns are in conflict with work security, especially for the weakest workers’ 
groups such as low skilled workers, and a high level of work security can be obtained only at the 
cost of low flexibility.  
An opposite view is at the basis of the “flexicurity” hypothesis, according to which flexibility and 
security are not contradictions, but can be mutually supportive thanks to appropriate labour market 
institutions (Madsen, 2002). The flexicurity model was first implemented by Denmark as a 
combination of numerical flexibility (thank to low employment protection legislation), social 
security (in the form of a generous system of unemployment benefits), and active labour market 
policies especially focussed on active job search and training. Thus, the main idea of flexicurity is 
to shift from job security (same job for all working life), to employment security, that is having 
employment possibilities all life long (EMCO, 2006).  
The hypothesis of balancing flexibility and security has been largely emphasized by EU policy 
makers; for example, Guideline No. 21 of the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Employment 
for the period 2005-2008 invite Member States to “…promote flexibility combined with employment 
security and reduce labour market segmentation”. In January 2006 the informal Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affair (EPSCO) Council put flexicurity at the centre of EU 
political agenda (European Commission, 2006). 
With regard to these issues, an important point is what affects the perception of work security and 
its impact on overall workers’ wellbeing. One hypothesis is that what matter is how different labour  
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market institutions and macroeconomic environment interact among them. For example, in order to 
protect workers against unemployment risk, either employment protection legislation (EPL) or 
unemployment benefits (UB) can be used.  
However, some recent contributions have shown that UB act better than EPL in favouring work 
security (Clark and Postel-Vinay, 2005; European Commission, 2006; Postel-Vinay and Saint 
Martin, 2005). One explanation for these results may be that stricter EPL for permanent workers 
favour the growth of flexibility “at the margin” in the form of a higher incidence of temporary work 
(European Commission, 2006). Put differently, countries with stringent regulation on permanent 
workers are characterised by dual labour markets, with a segment of highly protected workers 
coexisting with a segment of unprotected temporary workers, mainly among the most 
disadvantaged groups such as immigrants, women, the less skilled and young workers (Kahn, 
2007). Nonetheless, countries with strict EPL may be induced to increase flexibility “at the margin” 
by allowing the use of short temporary contracts because of the subsequent positive effects in terms 
of employment growth in the short run, even if this may imply a fall in average labour productivity 
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).   
Since various studies have also shown that countries with higher EPL are also characterised by 
lower UB (among others, Boeri et al., 2003), in countries with higher EPL workers may feel more 
insecure because they cannot count on the safety net provided by UB in case they lose their job.  
On the contrary, in countries characterised by flexicurity (i.e. low EPL, high UB and active labour 
market policies), also temporary workers may feel secure and happy about their employment (even 
if not about their job). 
A number of studies have looked at the effect of temporary contracts on job satisfaction (among the 
others, Bardasi and Francesconi, 2003; Booth et al., 2002; De Graaf-Zijl, 2005; De Witte and 
Naswall, 2003). They point out that a negative impact emerges only for specific forms of temporary 
employment (such as seasonal-casual jobs or temporary agency work) and/or for specific job facets 
(mainly job security and career prospects). In general no significant difference in overall job 
satisfaction emerges between workers in permanent jobs and workers on fixed-term contracts.  
Nikolaou et al. (2005) study the relationship between job satisfaction and job security measured in 
terms of unemployment expectations. After controlling for the potential endogeneity of the job 
satisfaction-job security relationship, they find that higher job security is linked to higher job 
satisfaction. However, they do no consider the effect of the type of contract. 
More in general, there are no microeconometric studies showing the joint effect of perceived job 
security and the type of contract on job satisfaction, probably also because the two concepts are 
often treated as interchangeable: given the formal lower level of job security characterizing  
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temporary contracts with respect to permanent ones, it is common wisdom to assume that temporary 
workers feel less secure of their job than permanent ones. 
Given this gap in the literature and departing from the (macro) flexicurity approach, we try to take a 
more microeconomic perspective, measuring the flexibility/security mix at the individual level. At 
this level, flexibility can be proxied by the type of contract (either permanent or temporary), while 
security can be measured through worker’s subjective evaluation of his/her job (or employment) 
security. In this context, our research hypothesis is that individual perceived security is not   
necessarily positively correlated with the formal level of employment protection that characterises 
workers’ employment contracts. As a matter of fact, temporary workers need not necessarily feel 
insecure and unhappy with their job if they are likely to hold continuously a job or if, in case they 
lose it, they can count on income stability thanks to generous UB and are likely to find rapidly a 
new job. At the same time, permanent workers may feel insecure if they are likely to lose their job 
and labour market is characterised by low flows out of unemployment (and, thus, high incidence of 
long term unemployment) due for example to strict EPL. For this reason, “flexicure” temporary 
workers may be more secure and satisfied with their job than “at risk” permanent workers. 
As in most of the previous empirical work, we also claim that the institutional context is important 
for both perceived job security and job satisfaction, but the effect of the individual 
flexibility/security mix (or individual flexicurity) discussed above should be robust within each 
welfare/flexicurity regime. 
In order to provide an empirical test for these hypotheses, the remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 provides more details of the theoretical background of our empirical analysis. 
Section 3 describes the data and reports descriptive results. Section 4 presents the empirical 
approach. Section 5 discusses the main econometric results and Section 6 provides a sensitivity 
analysis. Concluding remarks and some policy implications of our results are discussed in the last 
Section.   
 
2. Theoretical framework 
As before mentioned, the aim of our analysis is to evaluate the joint effect of the (objective) type of 
contract and the (subjective) perceived job security on job satisfaction. We will then consider 
interactions between job security and flexibility in order to evaluate the impact of different 
flexibility/security mix on overall job satisfaction.  
In socio-economic literature, the relationship between these two factors has been traditionally 
explored at the macroeconomic level. For example, the European Commission has tried to classify 
OECD countries in different groups according to their flexicurity model, the latter measured  
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through a set of variables aimed at capturing different dimensions of flexicurity at the country level, 
namely: strictness of EPL as a measure of numerical flexibility, expenditure on labour market 
policies (LMP, both passive and active) as a percentage of GDP, percentage of participants in 
lifelong training programmes and average tax-wedge as a measure of the distortions created by the 
tax system (European Commission, 2006) . The results of the principal component analysis carried 
out on the basis of these variables show that EU countries can be clustered in four main groups, 
corresponding to different flexicurity models
1. The identified clusters are: Anglo-Saxon countries 
(UK and Ireland) characterised by high flexibility (low EPL) and intermediate-to-low spending on 
LMP (i.e. security); Continental countries (Germany, Belgium, Austria and France) with 
intermediate-to-low flexibility and intermediate-to-high security; Mediterranean countries (Spain, 
Portugal and Greece) with low flexibility (high EPL) and low security
2; Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland) and the Netherlands, with intermediate to high flexibility and high security.  
These clusters are quite robust to the methodology and the definition of the variables used; similar 
results were in fact obtained by Muffels and Luijkx (2005) on the basis of more theoretical 
considerations on the main features of the prevalent welfare regimes in Europe, and by Nicoletti et 
al. (2000), who used separate measures of EPL for, respectively, regular and temporary jobs
3. In the 
latter a major exception is France, that is grouped with the Mediterranean countries instead of the 
Continental ones. 
These rankings were then used to show that the probability to move from temporary to permanent 
employment and/or between jobs, as well as job satisfaction, is heavily influenced by the 
institutional context and the welfare regime of the country in which workers are located. For 
example, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag (2006) use 1995-2000 ECHP data to examine the effect 
of the type of contract on individual’s job satisfaction in Spain and the Netherlands and show that 
this effect varies between the two countries analysed: while for Spain temporary contracts are 
strongly negatively correlated with job satisfaction, for the Netherlands there is no relationship 
between job satisfaction and fixed-term contracts lasting more than a year and casual contracts. One 
of the explanations provided by the authors for this result is the different level of uncertainty 
associated with temporary contracts in each country. Indeed, as we mentioned above, the 
Netherlands are considered, together with Denmark, the country where the flexicurity model has 
been successfully implemented.  
                                                 
1 Notice that, as clarified by the authors, the principal components analysis is based on correlation coefficients and thus 
it does not provide indications of causal relationships.  
2 Italy is geographically part of the Mediterranean area, although it has a lower level of security and a slightly higher 
level of flexibility (looser EPL) than other Mediterranean countries.  
3 Nicoletti et al. (2000) also show the existence of a positive correlation between the strictness of EPL and the 
regulation of product markets.  
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In this paper, we go further in  the microeconomic analysis of flexicurity by jointly considering the 
type of contract (either permanent or temporary) and perceived security, which refers to the 
likelihood of either losing the job in a certain time spell or finding relatively easily a new job in 
case of losing it. While the first definition of perceived security is more related to “pure” job 
security, the second one encompasses employment security, since it is aimed at measuring also the 
easiness of transition from one job to the other. In a flexicurity perspective, the latter may be the 
desirable measure of perceived security; nonetheless, also the first measure may capture some 
employment security, mainly in terms of transitions between different contracts/jobs within the 
same firm.   
The combination of flexibility and security at the micro level allows to define four different types of 
workers:  insecure temporary workers, characterized by job flexibility and low perceived security; 
flexicure workers, who are on a temporary contract but they perceive that their job is secure; 
permanent workers, whose contract couples low numerical flexibility with high security; 
permanent-at-risk workers who, despite the (indefinite) length of their contract, feel that their job is 
not secure (see Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Our claim is that what matters for overall worker’s well-being is mainly his/her perceived security 
rather than the formal protection characterising his/her employment relationship.  
In the following section we shall discuss the data used to actually measure the flexibility/security 
mix at the individual level and the subsequent identification of the four groups of workers depicted 
in Table 1. 
 
 
3. Data, definitions and descriptive analysis 
 
In this study data are from the 2001 Special Eurobarometer 56.1 “Social Exclusion and 
Modernization of Pension Systems”. Each survey of Standard Eurobarometer, which was 
established in 1973 with the aim of monitoring the evolution of public opinion in the Member 
States, consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per Member State (except Germany: 
2000, Luxembourg: 600, United Kingdom 1300 including 300 in Northern Ireland). Special 
Eurobarometer, whose reports are based on thorough thematic studies, are integrated in Standard 
Eurobarometer’s polling waves. The universe of the survey is citizens aged 15 and over residing in 
EU-15.  
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In the 2001 Special Eurobarometer 56.1, employees were asked a number of questions relative to 
their job, including the type of contract and their overall job satisfaction; they were also asked about 
satisfaction for different job facets, including satisfaction with security, and about the probability 
they assign to lose their current job in the following year. The data set contains also demographic 
and other background information like age, gender, nationality, marital status, occupation and 
education. For our analysis, we selected the sub-sample of employees excluding members of the 
armed force, corresponding to 6445 observations. 
The dependent variable of our empirical analysis is overall job satisfaction. The precise wording of 
the question in the Eurobarometer survey is “All in all, how satisfied would you say you are with 
your job?” Respondents are asked to provide a rating on a seven-point scale, with the lowest value 
corresponding to “completely dissatisfied” and the highest to “completely satisfied”. 
The variables of interest for our analysis are the dummy variables describing the contract/security 
mix that characterises workers’ job.  
Referring to the type of contract, workers with a flexible contract are those with seasonal, 
temporary or casual job and employees under contract for fixed time period. Permanent workers are 
those hired with a permanent contract.  
To evaluate the degree of security, we used the “probabilistic” question asking individuals about the 
probability they assign to losing their job. The exact question is “How likely or unlikely is that you 
will lose your job for some reason over the next twelve months? Would you say it is very likely, 
quite likely, not very likely or not at all likely?”
4. 
In light of the set of possible answers, we considered as “insecure” workers those stating that they 
were very likely or quite likely to lose their job in the twelve months following the survey. 
It should be also noticed that, given the wording of the question, our empirical measure of perceived 
security is limited to job security (rather than employment security) and the results presented in the 
following sections will be interpreted accordingly. As mentioned in section 2, some employment 
security (in terms of the likelihood of transitions between different contracts/positions within the 
firm) is captured also by this measure of security
5.  
                                                 
4 An alternative way to evaluate job security is to use the Eurobarometer question asking individuals to report their 
satisfaction with regard to their job security (“On a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is completely dissatisfied and 7 
completely satisfied, how satisfied would you say you are with your job security?”). However, as stressed by Clark and 
Postel-Vinay (2005) this formulation contains an important subjective element as the meaning of job security may vary 
from one person to another (and in some languages job security may be confused with job safety). Moreover, it refers 
both to probability and cost of job loss. For this reason, we prefer to use the “probabilistic” question, whose use is 
suggested also in Dominitz and Manski (1996) and Manski and Straub (1999). 
5 Unfortunately perceived security is rarely investigated in individual surveys: for example, the EHCP does not contain 
such type of questions. Furthermore, for the employees it is more likely to find questions related to job rather than 
employment security (in terms of the likelihood to find another job in case of losing the current one). 
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Once defined the type of contract and perceived job security on the basis of the information 
available in the survey, we have divided workers in the four groups presented in Table 1. The first 
group refers to “flexicure” workers, that is those on temporary contracts stating that they are not 
very likely or not at all likely to lose their job in the following twelve months. The second group 
refers to insecure temporary workers, that is those declaring they are very or quite likely to lose 
their job in the following year. The third group includes “permanent-at-risk” workers: permanent 
workers stating that they are very or quite likely to lose their job because the workplace will close 
down or they will be declared redundant (thus excluding voluntary quits and retirement); finally, the 
last group consists of the remaining permanent workers.   
Table 2 reports the distribution of workers according to their contract/security mix by country. The 
first thing to be noticed is that Mediterranean countries are those with the highest incidence of 
temporary (both insecure and flexicure) workers, especially Spain (20.5%), Portugal (17.9%) and 
Greece (16.4%). Nordic and Continental countries are those with the largest share of permanent 
employment.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Interestingly, Mediterranean countries are also those with the lowest share of flexicure temporary 
workers on overall temporary employment (45.8% on average), while the highest share is observed 
in Nordic countries (51.9%). Results for Denmark (68.1%) and the Netherlands (71.4%) suggest 
that “micro” and “macro” flexicurity go hand in hand.  
Also considering the sum of insecure workers (both temporary and permanent), Mediterranean 
countries are those with the highest fraction on total employment (10.2% on average), also slightly 
higher than in Anglo-Saxon countries (9.8%). The lowest values are found in many Continental 
countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg) and Denmark.  
Overall, results in Table 2 confirm that where institutions draw on principles of flexicurity, workers 
feel more secure of their job, independently of the type of protection that characterises it.  
As a first hint relative to what matters for individual job satisfaction (either employment protection 
as defined by the type of contract, or perceived security independently of the type of contract), 
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the sample according to the score of overall job satisfaction by 
workers type. In the first panel, workers are divided only according to their type of contract (either 
permanent or temporary), while in the second panel workers are classified according to the 
flexibility/security mix discussed above. 
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FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
As expected, the first panel points out that permanent workers are more satisfied of their job than 
temporary ones. However, the second panel shows that the type of contract by itself is not able to 
fully capture the effect of perceived job security. In fact, when we consider the four groups of 
workers defined by the combination of the type of contract and perceived job security, the 
distribution of job satisfaction is similar, on the one hand, between temporary flexicure and 
permanent secure workers and, on the other hand, between insecure temporary and permanent-at-
risk workers. This finding seems to confirm that the patterns of job satisfaction are more determined 
by perceived security than by the type of contract: happiest workers are those with a secure 
permanent contract, followed by flexicure temporary workers, permanent-at-risk and insecure 
temporary workers. Notice also that the difference in the reported level of job satisfaction between 
temporary and permanent-at-risk workers is negligible.    
Table 3 reports differences in mean job satisfaction between permanent workers and other workers’ 
type by welfare regime and country. The Table reports also t tests for the significance of the 
differences in mean values. Permanent workers turn out again to be the happiest workers, although 
in only few cases (Sweden, Germany and UK) they are significantly happier than flexicure workers. 
Note also that permanent-at-risk workers are significantly less satisfied than permanent ones mainly 
in most Continental countries.    
Once again descriptive results point to perceived security as a more important factor than the mere 
contract type for job satisfaction.  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
In the empirical analysis we assume that utility from job for the i-th worker (Ui) can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
Ui = Ui (Ti, Ii, Ei, Ji )         ( 1 )  
 
where T is the flexibility/security mix characterizing each worker (as proxied by one of the four 
worker types discussed in the previous section), I, E and J are vectors of controls for, respectively, 
individual, employer and job characteristics.    
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Utility from work is empirically proxied by self-reported job satisfaction, which is traditionally 
measured through a scale in which the lowest value corresponds to complete dissatisfaction and the 
highest value to complete satisfaction.  
The empirical (linear) equivalent of the utility function in (1) is then given by: 
 
JSi= α’DTi+β’Xi+εi         ( 2 )  
 
where JS is a measure of self-reported job satisfaction, DT is the set of dummy variables related to 
workers types (and α the corresponding parameters of interest to be estimated), X is a vector of 
observable individual, employer and job characteristics, βs the associated parameters to be 
estimated and ε the error term. 
Given the intrinsic ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and assuming that the error term is 
normally distributed, an ordered probit estimator is the usual candidate estimator. 
However, it has been shown that a traditional linear regression estimator may be used once the 
(ordinal) dependent variable has been properly transformed into a “pseudo “continuous one (Terza, 
1987; Van Praag et al., 2003; Van  Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonnell, 2006). This approach, proposed 
by Van  Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonnell  (2006) and named “Probit-OLS (POLS)”, is particularly 
useful if one has to deal with ordered response models with panel data or, as in our case, with a 
system of equations. Exploiting the latent variable approach used also in traditional ordered 
response estimates, the transformed variable is derived assuming that the observed job satisfaction 
levels (JS) is related to the “true” unobserved (continuous) propensity for job satisfaction (JS*, such 
that JSi = j   if µj-1 < JSi* < µj  for j=1,2,...k). But, unlike in ordered response models, all the µjs (the 
cut-off points) are then retrieved on the basis of the unconditional sample distribution and the true 
latent variable is approximated by its conditional expectation. Intuitively, even if we don’t observe 
the exact value of the latent variable for each individual/observation, we may approximate it with a 
set of means (whose number equals the number of categories of the observed ordinal variable and 
individuals with the same observed response are characterized by the same value of the transformed 
variable) of the underlying continuous latent variable. OLS (or other linear estimators) can then be 
used with the transformed dependent variable. Note that POLS estimates (in terms of sign and 
standard errors) are similar to Ordered Probit estimates but, as mentioned above, the possibility to 
use a linear estimator allows to better handle problems such as endogeneity and self-selection
6. 
The latter are in fact relevant also in job satisfaction equations. In our specific case, some 
unobservable factors (such as individual ability, motivation, and information regarding the labour 
                                                 
6 For more details on POLS see the technical appendix.  
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market) may be correlated with both the type of contract and job security. As long as some 
unobserved individual characteristics simultaneously affect both flexicurity and job satisfaction, the 
estimated effect of the first on the latter might be biased, since it captures also the effect of other 
unobservable confounding factors on job satisfaction. 
To take into account of potential endogeneity, we adopt two estimation strategies. First, we start 
exploiting the richness of the data-set in terms of information on individual characteristics, 
including a large set of variables on workers’ psychological attitude toward work and life. More 
specifically, the data set contains detailed information on job expectations (also in terms of security, 
flexibility and career prospects), physical and psychological uneasiness due to work (such as 
headaches or muscular pain due to work, continuous worrying, sleep problems, etc.), individual 
motivation (measured through the willingness to work even without the need to do that for living), 
importance and intensity of social relations, overall self-esteem. These variables may be considered 
as a good proxy for personality and psychological attitude, which are among the most important 
determinants of satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Hence, they are likely to capture 
the effect of unobserved time-invariant factors (such as individual ability, motivation, and personal 
attitudes) that are the primary source of endogeneity and are usually controlled for with fixed 
effects estimators when panel data is available
7.  
Second, we perform a two-stage procedure in which we first estimate the probability to be one of 
the four types of workers discussed in the previous section (i.e., insecure temporary worker, 
flexicure worker, permanent-at-risk worker and permanent worker) and then we use these estimates 
to control for endogeneity in the job satisfaction equation (estimated by POLS)
8. 
Given the multinomial nature of the endogenous variable, in the first stage we estimate the 
following equation using a multinomial logit: 
 
Ti=γT’XTi+εTi          ( 3 )  
 
where T is an indicator variable for the four worker types discussed above, X is a vector of 
observable characteristics, γs the associated parameters to be estimated and ε the error term. 
                                                 
7 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) point out that it is important to use fixed effects estimators or else to include as 
regressors the time-invariant personality traits. Given the nature of our data, we follow this second estimation strategy. 
8 We do not estimate an ordered probit in the second stage because a two-stage procedure provides consistent estimates 
only if the second equation is linear (Wooldridge, 2001). Alternatively, the two equations should be estimated 
simultaneously by Maximum Likelihood. However, in our specific case it may be quite difficult to define the joint 
distribution of the error terms, given that we should jointly estimate a multinomial logit and an ordered probit. In this 
sense, POLS provides a straightforward solution to all these computational problems.  
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From this first equation, we retrieve a set of correction terms (some sort of Inverse Mills Ratios) 
that we add as controls in the job satisfaction equation to take account of the possible correlation in 
the unobservables of the two models as follows: 
 
JSi= α’DTi+β’Xi+λ’E(εi/Ti)+εi       ( 4 )  
 
where all the terms have the same meaning as in (2) and E(εi/Ti) is a function of the estimated 
probabilities from equation (3), capturing the correlation between the unobservables of worker 
types and job satisfaction equation. 
Given the specification of equation (4), if the estimated λs are not statistically different from zero,  
the endogeneity issue may be ignored; on the contrary, if the estimated λs are statistically 
significant, the proposed specification allows to get unbiased estimates of our parameters of interest 
(i.e., the vector α). 
Following Dubin and McFadden (1984), the set of correction terms from a multinomial logit were 























         ( 5 )  
 
where P are estimated probabilities from equation (3). 
A final remark concerns the identification strategy. More specifically, other than relying on 
functional forms, identification may be achieved using a set of exclusion restrictions, that is 
variables that are significantly correlated with worker types but that don’t influence directly job 
satisfaction (and hence they may be excluded from the job satisfaction equation). In our specific 
case, during the survey the workers were asked to express their opinion on a number of general 
statements related to politics, society and social inclusion. Among them, the workers were asked 
how much they agreed (on a scale from 1 – strongly agree – to 5 – strongly disagree -) with the 
following two statements: 
1)  “The unemployed should be forced to take a job quickly, even if it is not as good as the previous 
job”; 
2) “The government should provide a job for everyone who wants it”. 
Workers who, respectively, disagree on the first statement and agree on the second one should be 
pickier in accepting temporary/insecure jobs. We also claim that workers’ opinion on these 
statements is highly influenced by the institutional context of the country in which they live and the  
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latter should influence the degree of flexicurity of their job. Furthermore, their opinion on these 
general statements should not directly influence their satisfaction for their current job once we 
control for worker types and other individual and job characteristics. In light of these 
considerations, we use as instruments two dummy variables capturing the worker’s opinion on the 
two statements above. 
 
 
5. Econometric results 
 
Table 4 reports the relevant results from the estimation of different specifications of equations (2) 
and (4). Columns differ also for the nature of the estimator used. The first three columns report 
ordered probit estimates, with the first specification being the most parsimonious: besides the 
flexicurity variables of interest, it controls for demographic, country and local labour market 
conditions, which should capture the influence of unemployment and job opportunities at the local 
level. Model 2 adds controls for employer and job characteristics. The inclusion of explanatory 
variables related to individual, employer and job characteristics are standard in the estimation of job 
satisfaction equations (among others see Clark, 1997). With regard to job characteristics, beside 
usual controls such as economic sector, firm size, occupation and tenure, we have exploited the 
richness of the dataset including all the job-related variables that should produce effects on job 
satisfaction, such as whether the worker has to work long hours, at very high speed, to tight 
deadlines or in dangerous or unhealthy conditions, and we have also included indicators of the type 
of  relationships inside the firm. We have controlled also for employment-related past events - such 
as whether the worker has been unemployed in the last five years or whether there has been a staff 
reduction in his/her firm, thus controlling that the estimated effect of the current flexibility/security 
mix on job satisfaction does not capture also the spurious effect of past events that can anyway 
influence current job satisfaction.   
As a first control for potential endogeneity, the full specification in Model 3 includes a large set of 
controls for personality and psychological characteristics, such as past and future job expectations, 
physical and psychological uneasiness due to work, attitudes towards work and life, self-esteem and 
intensity of social relations (see table A1 for a detailed description and basic statistics of all the 
covariates).  
Column 4 reports estimates by POLS for the same specification. Estimates based on the two-stage 
procedure discussed in section 4 are reported in column 5 and 6. In order to highlight the 
importance of controlling for psychological characteristics, the two columns differ for the presence 
of such controls (not used in columns 5, but included in column 6).  
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First stage multinomial logit estimates for the last specification are reported in table A2
9, while 
complete POLS estimates (referring to columns 4-6 in table 4) are reported in table A3.   
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Generally our results point out that job satisfaction of flexicure workers is not statistically different 
from that of permanent workers, regardless of the estimator and the specification used. On the 
contrary, compared to the latter, job satisfaction of insecure temporary workers and those on 
permanent contracts at risk of unemployment is much lower. Furthermore, the two negative 
coefficients are not statistically different
10, thus showing that permanent workers at risk of losing 
their job feel as unsatisfied as insecure temporary workers. Comparison of results in Table 4 shows 
that POLS estimates are coherent with Ordered Probit ones. Furthermore, estimates may be affected 
by endogeneity, but results don’t change from a qualitative point of view once we correct for it.  
It should be also noticed that estimates in columns 4 and 6 are very similar and some of the 
estimated correction terms in the second stage are statistically significant only in the model without 
controls for psychological characteristics (column 5)
11. These results suggest that in this case such 
controls are sufficient to take into account of potential endogeneity and in the following tables we 
shall use the model in column 4 as our preferred specification. 
To sum up, estimates in table 4 clearly highlight that job stability and perceived security are quite 
different things and the lack of job security is a primary source of job dissatisfaction, even when it 
is not coupled with flexibility. Furthermore, the combination “temporary but secure job” seems 
preferable, in terms of workers well-being, with respect to the combination “permanent but insecure 
job”, pointing out that the length of the contract may be less relevant if the worker perceives that 
he/she is not at risk of losing his/her job. 
Estimates by welfare regime reported in table 5 show that, despite of the differences across 
countries in the level of job satisfaction and in the incidence of the four types of workers previously 
discussed, in each group of countries insecure temporary workers are the least satisfied, and again 
no statistically significant differences in job satisfaction emerge between permanent and flexicure 
                                                 
9  In the first stage we included all the controls used in the job satisfaction equation and the two identifying restrictions 
(i.e, “ushouldnotacc” and “govshoudprov”). The Hausman test allows accepting the IIA. Furthermore, preliminary 
analysis showed that the two variables used for identification were jointly statistically not significant in the job 
satisfaction equation (F test (2, 16) = 1.7, with corresponding p-value=0.21), but statistically significant in the 
multinomial logit model estimated in the first stage (see estimates in the first two rows in table A2). 
10 The test of the null hypothesis of equality of the two coefficients in column 4 yields an F test of 0.3, with a 
corresponding p-value of  0.62. Similar results were obtained for the other specifications. 
11 Table A3 shows that also estimates for the other coefficients are generally similar, but in many cases standard errors 
are larger in column 6 than in column 4. This larger variance is due to the inclusion of the estimated correction terms 
(analytical standard errors are actually lower than the reported bootstrapped ones), which increase the variance without 
improving the explanatory power of the model once controlling for personality and psychological characteristics.  
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workers. The aggregate result related to permanent-at-risk workers seems driven mainly by the 
Continental countries, which are the only group characterized by statistically significant differences 
between permanent workers at risk of unemployment and other permanent workers.  
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
Given the availability of different measures of job satisfaction, we also tested whether our results 
change using different facets of job satisfaction as dependent variable. More specifically, we 
evaluated the impact of the flexibility/security mix on satisfaction with job security, career 
prospects, chance for own development and pay. We claim that our results should hold mainly 
when considering job facets more related to job security, either directly (as in the case of 
satisfaction for job security itself) or indirectly (as in the case of career prospects and the chance to 
develop yourself). On the contrary, the effect of perceived job security on other (more general) 
aspects of the job (such as pay) may be more ambiguous and difficult to predict.  
Estimation results reported in Table 6 overall confirm that perceived job security, together with 
contractual flexibility, significantly influences workers satisfaction mainly for job aspects more 
related to job security. 
Workers’ satisfaction for job security is the only facet for which flexicure temporary workers are 
statistically less satisfied than permanent ones, but the estimated differential is anyway much lower 
than the corresponding estimates for insecure temporary workers and permanent-at-risk ones. 
Furthermore, job security is the only aspect for which the latter are much more dissatisfied than 
insecure temporary workers
12.  
When considering other aspects of the job, including those that we expect to be more influenced by 
the permanent/temporary nature of job contract (such as career prospects and the chance for own 
development), flexicure workers are equally satisfied as permanent workers and more satisfied than 
permanent-at-risk workers, thus confirming our main results. 
Finally, satisfaction with pay is not significantly influenced by the flexibility/security mix 
characterising workers’ job except for insecure temporary workers (albeit the estimated negative 
coefficient is only weakly statistically significant), supporting that the estimated differences in 
overall job satisfaction by workers types discussed above are mainly driven by aspects of the job 
actually related to - or influenced by – perceived job security.   
                                                 
12 Differences among these coefficients are all statistically significant. The F tests on the equality of the estimated 
coefficients for flexicure workers and, respectively, insecure temporary and permanent-at-risk ones are equal to 10.2 
and 28.2 (in both cases p-value=0.00). Also the estimated coefficient for insecure temporary workers is statistically 
different from the one estimated for permanent-at-risk ones (F test=6.3, with corresponding p-value=0.01).  
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TABLE 6 HERE 
 
 
6. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis in order to test further the robustness of the main 
results discussed in the previous section. More specifically, we want to verify whether our estimates 
are sensitive to different definitions of the four workers types. This exercise is particularly 
important, given that our basic classification is partly based on arbitrary choices and other 
researchers may define the four workers types differently.  
We then replicated estimates slightly changing the definitions of workers’ types. As discussed in 
section 3, in the basic definition flexicure workers are those stating that are not very or not at all 
likely to lose their job in the following twelve months while insecure temporary workers are the 
remaining temporary ones; permanent-at-risk workers are permanent workers stating that are very 
or quite likely to lose their job because the firm will close down or they will be declared redundant, 
while permanent workers are the remaining permanent ones
13.  
We now adopt three different definitions of workers’ types. In the first, we use a larger definition of 
flexicure workers, considering part of them also temporary workers stating that are very or quite 
likely to lose their job for reasons different from lay-off, firm closing or expiring contract; insecure 
temporary workers are the remaining temporary ones, while permanent-at-risk and permanent ones 
are the same as in the basic definition. 
In the second definition, we adopt a larger definition of permanent-at-risk workers, considering 
among them also those stating that are very or quite likely to lose their job for “other reasons” 
(different from retirement, job change or family duties); permanent workers include the remaining 
workers on permanent contracts, while insecure temporary and flexicure workers are as in the basic 
definition. 
Finally, in the third definition we use the larger definition of both flexicure and permanent-at-risk 
workers.  
Table 7 displays the distribution of workers’ type according to the basic and to the three new 
definitions. With the larger definition of flexicure workers, the share of these latter on the whole 
                                                 
13 The question related to the reasons for leaving the current employer provided the following list of reasons: 1) The 
organization/workplace will close down; 2) I will be declared redundant; 3) I will reach normal retirement age; 4) My 
contract of employment will expire (for temporary workers); 5) I will take early retirement; 6) I will decide to leave and 
work for another employer; 7) I will decide to leave and work for myself as self-employed; 8) I will have to look after 
my home, relatives or children; 9) Other reasons.   
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group of employees changes from 5.4% to 6.9%, while when adopting the larger definition of 
permanent-at-risk workers, their share varies from 2.5% to 8.7%.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
In Table 8 we report estimation results of the job satisfaction equation adopting the three alternative 
definitions of workers’ types.  
Comparing these estimates with those in column 4 of Table 4, it can be noticed that ore main results 
hold: once again insecure temporary workers and permanent-at-risk workers are the least satisfied
14, 
whatever the adopted definition, while no significant differences emerge between flexicure workers 
and permanent ones.  
Overall, these results show that the main message of our estimates, that is that what matter for job 
satisfaction is more perceived job security than the type of contract, seems robust to changes in the 
definition of workers’ types.  
 




Employment stability is desirable not only for workers, but also for firms, which dislike high 
turnover and prefer stable employment relationship in order to recoup human capital investment and 
selection costs. However, the intensification of competitive pressures has required in the last 
decades more flexibility both on firms and on workers side.  
According to the “flexicurity” approach, the two goals of flexibility and security are not 
contradictions, but can be mutually supportive thanks to appropriate workplace practices and labour 
market institutions. The hypothesis of balancing flexibility and security has been largely 
emphasized in the last years also by EU policy makers. 
Departing from the (macro) flexicurity approach, in this paper we tried to take a more 
microeconomic perspective, measuring the flexibility/security mix at the individual level. More 
specifically, by measuring flexibility through the type of contract and security through perceived 
job security, we empirically tested at the individual level the hypothesis that what matters for job 
                                                 
14 Even if the use of these alternative definitions seems to widen the gap between insecure temporary and permanent-at-
risk workers, making the latter much more dissatisfied, the difference between the two coefficients is not statistically 
significant (the F test on the equality of the two coefficients in the last column of table 7 is equal to 1.8, with a 
corresponding p-value of  0.18).  
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satisfaction is not only the type of contract (whether permanent or temporary), but mainly workers’ 
perceived security, which may be independent of the type of contract.  
To test this hypothesis, we split workers in four groups according to the flexibility/security mix 
characterizing their employment relationship and we analysed the impact of this mix on overall job 
satisfaction. Moreover, we studied whether this effect changes with the welfare regime considered 
and when considering workers’ satisfaction for different aspects of the job.   
Overall, also after controlling for endogeneity, our results point out that job satisfaction of flexicure 
temporary workers is not statistically different from that of permanent workers. On the contrary, 
compared to the latter, job satisfaction of insecure temporary workers and that of permanent-at-risk 
workers is much lower. Our main conclusions generally hold within different welfare regimes and 
also for different aspects of job satisfaction, mainly for those more related to job security. 
Furthermore, our results are robust to the use of alternative definitions of workers’ types.  
Thus, our estimates clearly highlight that job stability and perceived security are not the same thing 
and job satisfaction is relatively low mainly when perceived job security is low. Furthermore, the 
combination “temporary but secure job” (hence, the lack of only job stability) seems preferable with 
respect to the combination “permanent but insecure job” (that is the lack of only job security), 
pointing out that the length of the contract may be less relevant if the worker perceives that he/she is 
not at risk of becoming unemployed. 
Overall our results indicate that flexicurity, also at the micro level, is a very important determinant 
of job satisfaction: in this sense, more flexibility may be introduced without necessarily reducing 
job satisfaction if this doesn’t negatively affect perceived job security.  
From a policy point of view, this may be guaranteed either directly by the employer or indirectly by 
the policy maker through an appropriate mix of labour market policies.  
Within the firm, the employer may in fact reduce the negative effect of the temporary contract on 
individual job satisfaction if this is somehow associated with some job continuity. When a 
permanent contract is lacking, job continuity may be sustained through adequate working 
conditions, such as training opportunities, career prospects and good internal relationships.  
From the policy maker point of view, flexibility can be obtained without detrimental effects on 
workers’ satisfaction if policies aimed at favouring the use of flexible contracts are coupled with 
policies aimed at enhancing employment stability, such as active labour market policies helping 
workers in their transition from one job to another.  
More in general, given the increasing incidence of temporary contracts in the labour market, a shift 
from “job security” (i.e., the same job for life) to “employment security” (i.e., staying in  
19
employment for life, eventually making transitions between jobs or firms) should loosen up the link 
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Technical Appendix - Probit OLS (POLS) 
Probit OLS (POLS) represents an alternative approach to traditional ordered response models. 
Assume that the dependent variable Y is categorical and naturally ordered (for example, ranging 
from “very low” to “ very high” or from “very dissatisfied” to “very satisfied”). Assume also that 
the observed variable is related to a “true” unobserved continuous one (say Y*) such that: 
Y i = j   if µj-1 < Yi* < µj    for  j=1,2,...k       (I) 
This implies that the latent variable is partitioned in k intervals such that if the jth response is 
observed, then the latent variable Y* lies in the range (µj-1 , µj]. Define µ0=-∞ and  µk=+∞. 
Define also as p1,…pk the frequency for each category of the observed ordinal variable. 
Assume that Y* has a standard normal distribution in the population. Given the distributional 
assumption, the µjs can be estimated exploiting that: 
pj=N(µj)-N(µj-1) ,   j = 1 , … . k - 1          ( I I )  
where N is the cumulative standard normal distribution. 
Even if we don’t know the exact value of the latent variable for each observation, we can compute 
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where n is the standard normal density. 
i Y  is a discrete random variable with chances equal to pj. It represents the discrete version of the 
underlying continuous variable and it has as many values as the observed categorical variable.  
OLS and other linear estimators may be used with  i Y  as dependent variable. This procedure was 
called Probit OLS – POLS (Van Praag, 2005; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonnell, 2006). 
POLS estimates are coherent with Ordered Probit estimates, but the adoption of POLS allows to 
better handle econometric issues such as endogeneity, simultaneous equations and estimates with 
panel data. In many of these cases it also substantially reduces computational time (Van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonnell, 2006). 
This approach is also useful in presence of ordinal variables among the regressors (for some 
applications, see Terza, 1987; Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonnell, 
2004). 
With respect to linear estimations with the “true” latent variable, there is some loss of information 
due to discretization, implying that the residual variance is underestimated and hence the 
corresponding t-statistics are overestimated. Note, however, that the same problem affects also 
Ordered Probit estimates and hence the use of POLS should not cause any further loss of 
information with respect to using an Ordered Probit estimator.  
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Temporary, all Permanent, allTable 1 - Types of workers by job security and flexibility
         Flexibility      













Total 5.9 2.5 5.4 86.3 100
Nordic countries 3.6 3.2 5.4 87.8 100
DK 2.8 3.4 5.9 87.9 100
FIN 6.2 2.4 3.4 88.0 100
SW 4.2 4.1 4.2 87.5 100
NET 2.7 2.8 6.7 87.8 100
Continental countries 5.1 2.2 4.4 88.4 100
A 1.6 4.1 2.8 91.5 100
B+L 3.6 2.2 5.6 88.5 100
FR 8.8 3.4 4.9 82.8 100
GER 3.1 1.2 4.0 91.7 100
Southern countries 8.2 2.0 6.9 82.9 100
GR 10.4 5.2 6.0 78.4 100
IT 6.6 2.4 3.8 87.2 100
P 10.0 0.8 7.9 81.3 100
SP 9.5 1.2 11.0 78.4 100
Anglo-saxon countries 5.8 4.0 5.7 84.5 100
IRE 6.3 1.8 6.7 85.2 100
UK 5.8 4.1 5.6 84.5 100Table 3 - Average job satisfaction by workers type and country
Permanent 
(avg)
Total -0.99 *** -0.89 *** -0.21 *** 5.1
Nordic countries -0.77 *** -0.45 *** -0.09 5.5
DK -0.85 *** 0.08 0.23 5.6
FIN -0.63 *** 0.49 0.21 5.2
SW -0.32 -0.63 *** -0.46 * 5.4
NET -1.11 *** -0.81 ** -0.20 5.7
Continental countries -0.99 *** -1.23 *** -0.17 5.1
A -0.46 -1.54 *** -0.39 5.3
B+L -1.21 *** -1.34 *** 0.39 ** 5.3
FR -0.94 *** -0.86 *** 0.26 4.8
GER -0.70 *** -1.53 *** -0.55 ** 5.3
Southern countries -0.79 *** -0.58 ** -0.13 4.9
GR -1.08 *** -0.29 0.14 4.9
IT -0.44 -0.64 0.13 4.8
P -0.69 *** -1.61 *** -0.19 4.9
SP -0.99 *** -0.17 -0.26 4.9
Anglo-saxon countries -1.37 *** -0.90 *** -0.47 ** 5.2
IRE -0.90 *** 0.16 0.21 5.0
UK -1.40 *** -0.94 *** -0.51 ** 5.2





FlexicureTable 4 - Job satisfaction estimates, relevant coefficients
12345 6
Ref group: permanent workers
insecure temporary -0.575 *** -0.298 *** -0.235 *** -0.184 ** -0.229 *** -0.181 **
0.061 0.066 0.067 0.079 0.085 0.081
permanent at risk -0.594 *** -0.400 *** -0.334 *** -0.251 ** -0.289 *** -0.239 **
0.086 0.088 0.088 0.115 0.113 0.114
flexicure -0.084 0.122 * 0.068 0.052 0.105 0.053
0.062 0.065 0.066 0.077 0.084 0.079
OTHER CONTROLS
demographics, country f.e. and 
local area conditions;
YES YES YES YES YES YES
employer and job characteristics; NO YES YES YES YES YES
personality and psychological 
characteristics (past and future 
expectations, uneasiness due to 
work,  work and life attitued, 
social relations, self-esteem)
NO NO YES YES NO YES
E(ε/T=temporary) - - - - 0.134 * 0.035
E(ε/T=permanent at risk) - - - - -0.072 ** -0.034
E(ε/T=flexicure) - - - - -0.028 0.009
LR/Wald chi2 (df)  627.4 (29) 2102.0 (74) 2485.8 (91) 2168.9 (91) 1795.5 (77) 2304.84 (94)
Pseudo/Adjusted R
2 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.36 0.31 0.35
N. observations 5768 5609 5609 5609 5609 5609
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; standard errors in italicus
Ordered probit POLS
Note: in column 4 robust standard errors; in column 5 and 6 conditional expectation correction method as in Dubin-McFadden (1984), bootstrapped standard errors 
(1000 replications).
2 stage POLS 
(D-McF correction)Table 5 - Job satisfaction estimates by welfare regimes
Ref group: permanent workers
insecure temporary -0.276 ** -0.219 ** -0.194 ** -0.361 **
0.11 0.096 0.105 0.149
permanent at risk 0.058 -0.384 *** 0.041 -0.198
0.141 0.122 0.183 0.200
flexicure -0.076 0.007 0.117 0.022
0.105 0.096 0.105 0.153
 R2 0.32 0.36 0.32 0.32
N observations 1585 2177 1080 767
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; robust standard errors in italicus








countriesTable 6 - Estimates with alternative definitions of job satisfaction
Ref group: permanent workers
insecure temporary -0.513 *** -0.275 *** -0.145 * -0.137 *
0.086 0.075 0.079 0.074
permanent at risk -0.833 *** -0.263 ** -0.027 -0.081
0.099 0.120 0.121 0.116
flexicure -0.166 ** -0.023 0.034 -0.048
0.076 0.074 0.076 0.073
R
2 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.34
N. observations 5601 5595 5605 5607





Chance for own 
development
Note: POLS estimates; model specification as in column 4 of table 4. 
PayTable 7 - Alternative definitions of workers types






Basic definition 5.9 2.5 5.4 86.3 100
1 Larger def. of flexicure 4.3 2.5 6.9 86.3 100
2 Larger def. of perm at risk 5.9 8.7 5.4 80.1 100
3 Combination of the previous two 4.3 8.7 6.9 80.1 100
Note: In the basic definition, flexicure workers are those stating that are not very or not at all likely to lose their job in the 
following 12 months. Insecure temporary workers are the remaining temporary ones. Permanent workers at risk of unemployment 
are permanent workers stating that are very or quite likely to lose their job because the firm will close down or they will be 
declared redundant. Permanent workers are the remaining permanent ones.
In 1, flexicure workers as in the basic definition + temporary workers stating that are very or quite likely to lose their job for 
reasons different from lay-off, firm closing or expiring contract. Insecure temporary workers are the remaining temporary ones. 
Permanent workers at risk of unemployment and  permanent ones are defined as in the basic definition.
In 2, Permanent workers at risk of unemployment as in the basic definition + those stating that are very or quite likely to lose their 
job for reasons different from retirement, job change or family duties. Permanent workers include the remaining workers on 
permanent contracts. Insecure temporary and flexicure workers are defined as in the basic definition.
In 3, larger definition of both flexicure and permanent at risk workers.Table 8 - Robustness check: alternative definitions of workers types
Ref group: permanent workers
insecure temporary -0.133 ** -0.233 *** -0.177 ***
0.057 0.080 0.090
permanent at risk -0.246 *** -0.325 *** -0.318 ***
0.067 0.062 0.062
flexicure -0.025 0.024 -0.059
0.044 0.077 0.067
R
2 0.35 0.36 0.36
N. observations 5609 5609 5609
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; robust standard errors in italicus
Note: POLS estimates; model specification as in column 4 of table 4. See note in table 7 for details on 






BothTable A1. Variables description
Name Description Mean Std dev
insecure temporary 1 if seasonal, temporary or casual job and employees under contract or for fixed time period, very/quite likely to lose job in the 
following year
0.059 0.235
flexicure 1 if seasonal, temporary or casual job and employees under contract or for fixed time period, not very/not at all likely to lose 
job in the following year
0.054 0.225
permatrisk 1 if permanent worker very/quite likely to lose job in the following year 0.025 0.157
permanent 1 if permanent worker not very/not at all likely to lose job in the following year 0.863 0.344
Individual and local characteristics
female 1 if female 0.430 0.495
age Age (continuous) 37.981 11.454
age2 Squared age  (continuous) 1573.761 914.523
education Age when stopped full time education minus 6 (continuous) 12.448 3.779
married 1 if married 0.636 0.481
head 1 if contributes most to the household income 0.626 0.484
child5 1 if has a child under five years of age 0.175 0.380
Residence (ref: rural area or village)
small_town 1 if lives in small or middle sized town 0.377 0.485
large_town 1 if lives in large town  0.300 0.458
local_u 1 if agrees that there is a lot of unemployment in the area in which lives 0.253 0.435
area_rep 1 if strongly agrees that the area in which lives has not a good reputation 0.040 0.197
localjob 1 if thinks that job opportunities in local area are very good 0.139 0.346
Employer and job characteristics(including employment-related past events)
Firm size (ref: lee than 10 people)
size_1049 1 if 10-49 people 0.314 0.464
size_5099 1 if 50-99 people 0.102 0.302
size_100499 1 if 100-499 people 0.161 0.367
size_500 1 if more than 500 people 0.113 0.317
Sector of employment (ref: manufacturing)
i_agriculture 1 if agriculture, hunting, forestry, fishing 0.006 0.075
i_mining 1 if mining and quarrying 0.002 0.050
i_electricity 1 if electricity, gas and water supply 0.010 0.101
i_construction 1 if construction 0.066 0.248
i_trade 1 if wholesale and retail trade repairs 0.145 0.352
i_hotels 1 if hotels and restaurants 0.036 0.185
i_transportation 1 if transportation and communications 0.068 0.253
i_finance 1 if financial intermediation 0.037 0.188
i_business 1 if real estate and business activities 0.075 0.263
i_pa 1 if public administration 0.092 0.289
i_services 1 if other services 0.232 0.422
public 1 if works in the public sector 0.365 0.482Table A1. Variables description (continued)
Name Description Mean Std dev
Occupation (ref: unskilled manual worker)
o_professional 1 if employed professional 0.025 0.155
o_topmanager 1 if general management, director or top management 0.029 0.167
o_middelmanager 1 if middle management, other management 0.144 0.351
o_desk 1 if employed position: working mainly at a desk 0.203 0.402
o_travelling 1 if employed position: travelling 0.061 0.240
o_service 1 if employed position: service job 0.139 0.346
o_supervisor 1 if supervisor 0.038 0.191
o_skilledbc 1 if skilled manual worker 0.234 0.423
Tenure (ref: less than 3 years)
tenure_3to4 1 if 3-4 years 0.309 0.462
tenure_5to9 1 if 5-9 years 0.200 0.400
tenure_10 1 if equal or more than 10 years 0.365 0.481
union 1 if member of a trade union 0.249 0.432
Labour income (ref: very bad)
income_verygood 1 if the worker states that his/her income is very good 0.166 0.372
income_fairlygood 1 if the worker states that his/her income is fairly good 0.631 0.483
income_fairlybad 1 if the worker states that his/her income is fairly bad 0.179 0.383
hours number of weekly working hours (continuous) 37.735 11.049
skillmatch 1 if uses experiences, skills and abilities 0.737 0.440
use_ict 1 if the job involves the use of computerise or automated equipment 0.525 0.499
job_extratime 1 if often has to work extratime 0.130 0.337
job_speed 1 if works almost all the time at very high speed 0.145 0.352
job_deadlines 1 if works almost all the time to tight deadlines 0.134 0.341
job_dangerous 1 if works always/often in dangerous or unhealthy conditions 0.111 0.314
injury 1 if had an injury at work in the last five years 0.100 0.300
rel_ind 1 if relations at the workplace between management and employees are very good 0.186 0.389
rel_hor 1 if has good friends at work 0.314 0.464
rel_ver 1 if get support from management when there is pressure at work 0.153 0.360
been_promoted 1 if have been promoted while with current employer 0.323 0.468
staff_reduction 1 if the number of people employed in the organisation has been reduced over the last 3 years 0.251 0.433
ben_unemployed 1 if unemployed in the last five years 0.181 0.385
Proxies for personality and psycological characteristics
exp_secure 1 if thinks very important to have a secure job  0.066 0.249
promotion_in 1 if strongly agrees that is likely to get a better job in current organisation in the next 3 years 0.049 0.217
promotion_out 1 if strongly agrees that is likely to get a better job with another employer in the next 3 years 0.045 0.208
values 1 if finds that his/her values are very similar to those of his/her organisation 0.114 0.318
proud 1 if very proud of working for his/her company 0.168 0.374
tired_physical 1 if often has headaches and/or muscular pains due to work 0.201 0.401
tired 1 if often exhausted and/or too tired after work 0.335 0.472
stressful 1 if work is often stressful and/or keep worrying about job problems after work 0.396 0.489
motivation 1 if thinks absolutely necessary to have a successful career  0.534 0.499
motivation2 1 if states continue to work if were to get enough money to live as confortably as would like 0.526 0.499
unsleep 1 if often lost much sleep over worry 0.157 0.364
worthless 1 if thinks of himself/herself as a worthless person 0.053 0.223Table A1. Variables description (continued)
Name Description Mean Std dev
socialrel 1 if regularly meets friends, relatives and/or neighbours 0.827 0.378
member 1 if member of clubs, voluntary organisation and/or political party 0.421 0.494
Political party (ref: left)
pol_right 1 if right 0.141 0.348
pol_centre 1 if centre 0.354 0.478
pol_dk 1 if does not know 0.222 0.416
Country of residence (ref: Italy)
c_be 1 if Belgium 0.026 0.160
c_dk 1 if Denmark 0.019 0.137
c_de 1 if Germany 0.262 0.440
c_gr 1 if Greece 0.017 0.129
c_es 1 if Spain 0.094 0.292
c_fr 1 if France 0.173 0.378
c_ie 1 if Ireland 0.008 0.088
c_lu 1 if Luxemburg 0.001 0.036
c_nl 1 if Netherlands 0.039 0.194
c_pt 1 if Portugal 0.022 0.147
c_uk 1 if UK 0.158 0.365
c_fi 1 if Finland 0.011 0.102
c_se 1 if Sweden 0.028 0.164
c_at 1 if Austria 0.022 0.147
Variables used for identification in 2 stage POLS
ushouldnotacc 1 if disagrees that unemployed should be forced to take a job quickly, even if it not as good as the previous job 0.103 0.304
govshouldprov 1 if strongly agrees that the government should provide a job for everyone who wants it 0.390 0.488Table A2
Multinomial logit estimates
Model specification as in column 6 of table 4
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
ushouldnotacc 0.12 0.27 0.78 *** 0.31 -0.12 0.28
govshouldprov -0.15 0.21 -0.11 0.26 -0.38 ** 0.20
Personal and local characteristics
female 0.21 0.22 0.61 * 0.34 0.29 0.23
age 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.19 *** 0.06
age2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00
education 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.04
married -0.49 ** 0.22 -0.40 * 0.25 -0.05 0.21
head -0.22 0.20 0.08 0.33 -0.67 *** 0.22
child5 -0.04 0.26 -0.03 0.31 0.16 0.25
small_town -0.13 0.24 0.38 0.29 -0.06 0.22
large_town -0.34 0.24 -0.14 0.33 0.12 0.24
local_u 0.27 0.21 0.40 0.26 0.11 0.22
area_rep 0.01 0.39 0.00 0.63 -0.25 0.42
localjob 0.12 0.27 -0.32 0.48 0.16 0.25
Employer and job characteristics
size_1049 -0.45 ** 0.23 -0.58 0.38 -0.05 0.23
size_5099 -0.78 * 0.42 -0.79 0.51 -0.13 0.36
size_100499 -0.27 0.33 0.39 0.33 -0.19 0.33
size_500 -0.70 * 0.40 -0.26 0.46 0.34 0.33
public 0.30 0.24 -0.04 0.28 -0.05 0.22
tenure_3to4 -1.16 *** 0.22 -0.93 *** 0.35 -0.37 0.24
tenure_5to9 -2.31 *** 0.41 -2.01 *** 0.58 -1.00 *** 0.37
tenure_10 -2.49 *** 0.47 -1.20 ** 0.50 -1.07 *** 0.36
union -0.63 ** 0.28 0.49 * 0.29 0.11 0.26
income_verygood -1.10 ** 0.56 -0.36 0.74 0.38 0.76
income_fairlygood -0.76 * 0.47 0.09 0.61 0.80 0.71
income_fairlybad -0.49 0.45 0.99 * 0.62 0.97 0.73
hours -0.02 * 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 *** 0.01
skillmatch -0.51 ** 0.21 0.11 0.32 -0.21 0.22
use_ict 0.17 0.23 0.49 * 0.27 0.22 0.23
job_extratime -0.10 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.10 0.41
job_speed 0.20 0.36 -0.35 0.39 -0.26 0.34
job_deadlines -0.21 0.42 0.01 0.37 0.37 0.36
job_dangerous 0.15 0.29 0.41 0.33 0.17 0.28
rel_ind -0.46 0.30 -0.70 * 0.42 -0.43 * 0.26
rel_hor -0.27 0.25 0.40 0.31 -0.11 0.25
rel_vert -0.15 0.35 -0.33 0.53 0.57 ** 0.28
injury -0.01 0.31 0.20 0.36 0.00 0.30
been_promoted -0.74 ** 0.29 0.12 0.27 -1.21 *** 0.32
staff_reduction 0.32 0.23 0.80 *** 0.23 0.14 0.24
ben_unemployed 0.62 *** 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.41 * 0.25
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Occupation dummies yes yes yes
Flexicure
Worker type (ref: permanent)
Insecure temporary Permanent at riskProxies for personality and psychological characteristics
exp_secure -0.06 0.20 -0.14 0.25 -0.09 0.20
promotion_in -0.09 0.38 -0.35 0.57 0.88 *** 0.34
promotion_out 1.21 *** 0.31 0.61 0.43 -0.03 0.38
values 0.22 0.50 -0.36 0.54 -0.72 * 0.38
proud 0.11 0.40 -0.51 0.48 0.89 *** 0.31
tired_physical 0.32 0.26 -0.12 0.34 0.32 0.26
tired -0.18 0.25 0.31 0.27 -0.05 0.23
stressful 0.29 0.24 0.39 0.29 0.02 0.24
motivation 0.01 0.21 -0.08 0.28 0.25 0.20
motivation2 -0.30 * 0.19 -0.27 0.26 0.39 ** 0.20
unsleep 0.12 0.26 0.46 0.30 -0.47 0.33
worthless 0.54 * 0.33 0.15 0.49 -0.45 0.48
socialrel -0.03 0.27 0.15 0.30 -0.26 0.27
member -0.03 0.22 0.41 * 0.25 0.08 0.20
pol_right -0.36 0.30 0.15 0.37 -0.07 0.32
pol_centre -0.20 0.25 -0.22 0.31 -0.22 0.23
pol_dk -0.20 0.27 -0.05 0.35 -0.12 0.27
Country Fixed Effects
c_be -0.48 0.49 0.07 0.59 -0.09 0.52
c_dk -0.54 0.54 0.18 0.56 -0.21 0.55
c_de -0.94 ** 0.43 -0.74 0.53 -0.05 0.46
c_gr 0.13 0.49 0.78 0.57 -0.06 0.57
c_es 0.23 0.44 -0.71 0.81 0.85 ** 0.46
c_fr 0.11 0.41 0.57 0.47 0.18 0.49
c_ie -0.27 0.49 0.20 0.67 -0.01 0.53
c_lu -0.34 0.64 0.28 0.59 0.63 0.57
c_nl -0.37 0.53 0.57 0.55 0.46 0.49
c_pt 0.24 0.45 -0.78 0.74 0.26 0.54
c_uk -0.56 0.45 0.57 0.52 -0.32 0.50
c_fi 0.15 0.49 -0.51 0.63 -0.05 0.55
c_se -0.06 0.52 0.00 0.53 -0.33 0.55
c_at -1.65 *** 0.64 0.61 0.54 -0.49 0.52
Constant 1.05 1.20 -4.84 ** 2.01 2.52 ** 1.26
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Hausman test allows to accept the IIA (chi2=0.00 regardless of the omitted alternative)Table A3
Estimates of job satisfaction equation, POLS estimates
The number of the columns refers to the corresponding models in table 4
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
insecure temporary -0.18 ** 0.08 -0.23 *** 0.09 -0.18 ** 0.08
permatrisk -0.25 ** 0.12 -0.29 *** 0.11 -0.24 ** 0.11
flexicure 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.08
Personal and local characteristics
female 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06
age -0.02 * 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03
age2 0.0002 ** 0.00 0.0004 0.00 0.0001 0.00
education 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
married 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.10
head 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06
child5 -0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.05
small_town 0.03 0.04 0.14 ** 0.06 0.08 0.07
large_town -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.11
local_u 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05
area_rep -0.02 0.11 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.13
localjob 0.08 * 0.05 -0.08 0.09 0.03 0.07
Employer and job characteristics
size_1049 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.09
size_5099 0.06 0.05 0.17 0.13 0.06 0.15
size_100499 0.03 0.05 0.24 ** 0.11 0.11 0.10
size_500 0.11 ** 0.06 0.42 ** 0.21 0.15 0.24
public -0.05 0.04 -0.20 ** 0.09 -0.08 0.10
tenure_3to4 -0.01 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.21
tenure_5to9 -0.04 0.07 0.30 0.32 0.02 0.36
tenure_10 0.01 0.07 0.63 0.42 0.17 0.46
union -0.07 * 0.04 0.30 0.19 0.05 0.23
income_verygood 0.33 *** 0.12 0.93 *** 0.37 0.39 0.36
income_fairlygood 0.14 0.12 0.65 ** 0.33 0.21 0.35
income_fairlybad -0.19 0.12 0.38 0.33 -0.06 0.38
hours -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.00 0.00
skillmatch 0.35 *** 0.04 0.65 *** 0.14 0.42 *** 0.13
use_ict 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05
job_extratime -0.02 0.05 -0.002 0.06 0.01 0.08
job_speed 0.01 0.06 -0.20 * 0.12 -0.04 0.13
job_deadlines -0.07 0.06 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.13
job_dangerous -0.09 * 0.06 -0.14 ** 0.06 -0.07 0.06
rel_ind 0.39 *** 0.04 0.44 *** 0.06 0.38 *** 0.06
rel_hor 0.09 ** 0.04 0.39 *** 0.11 0.17 * 0.10
rel_vert 0.12 ** 0.05 0.13 * 0.08 0.08 0.12
injury -0.10 * 0.06 -0.11 * 0.06 -0.08 0.06
been_promoted 0.02 0.04 0.30 ** 0.14 0.14 0.10
staff_reduction -0.10 *** 0.04 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.05
ben_unemployed -0.01 0.05 -0.17 * 0.10 -0.05 0.11
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Occupation dummies yes yes yes
Column 6
POLS estimates (columns 4-6 in table 4)
Column 4 Column 5Proxies for personality and psychological characteristics
exp_secure 0.08 ** 0.03 - 0.08 ** 0.04
promotion_in 0.07 0.07 - 0.02 0.15
promotion_out -0.34 *** 0.09 - -0.39 0.30
values 0.01 0.07 - -0.03 0.21
proud 0.43 *** 0.05 - 0.34 *** 0.10
tired_physical -0.09 ** 0.04 - -0.14 ** 0.08
tired -0.02 0.04 - 0.04 0.08
stressful -0.13 *** 0.04 - -0.12 ** 0.06
motivation 0.02 0.03 - 0.00 0.04
motivation2 0.15 *** 0.03 - 0.14 0.12
unsleep -0.03 0.05 - 0.02 0.09
worthless -0.16 * 0.09 - -0.18 0.21
socialrel 0.07 * 0.04 - 0.10 ** 0.05
member 0.01 0.03 - 0.05 0.07
pol_right 0.08 * 0.05 - 0.13 0.11
pol_centre -0.01 0.04 - -0.01 0.04
pol_dk 0.005 0.05 - 0.02 0.06
Country Fixed Effects 
c_be 0.08 0.07 0.34 ** 0.14 0.14 0.14
c_dk 0.21 *** 0.08 0.57 *** 0.16 0.30 ** 0.16
c_de 0.26 *** 0.07 0.47 *** 0.16 0.28 0.20
c_gr -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.10
c_es -0.03 0.07 -0.28 ** 0.13 -0.15 0.10
c_fr -0.10 0.07 -0.02 0.08 -0.05 0.08
c_ie -0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.12
c_lu 0.22 *** 0.08 0.54 *** 0.19 0.27 0.22
c_nl 0.31 *** 0.08 0.66 *** 0.21 0.40 * 0.23
c_pt -0.03 0.08 -0.19 0.14 -0.15 0.13
c_uk 0.12 * 0.07 0.43 *** 0.17 0.25 0.18
c_fi 0.29 *** 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.22 * 0.12
c_se 0.19 *** 0.08 0.28 *** 0.07 0.20 ** 0.08
c_at 0.21 *** 0.08 1.01 ** 0.41 0.46 0.45
Correction terms
E(ε/T=temp) 0.13 * 0.08 0.03 0.09
E(ε/T=permatrisk) -0.07 ** 0.03 -0.03 0.03
E(ε/T=flexicure) -0.03 0.04 0.01 0.05
Constant -0.58 ** 0.23 -1.59 *** 0.49 -1.22 ** 0.49
legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
Note: robust standard errors in column 4, bootstrapped standard errors in columns 5 and 6